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Shattering Copyright Law: Will James
Stewart's Rear Window Become A Pane
In The Glass?
Barbara A. Allen, Esq.,* and Susan R. Swift**
INTRODUCTION
On April 24, 1990, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
Ninth Circuit's decision, Abend v. MCA, Inc.' Petitioner James
Stewart's appeal from the Ninth Circuit presented a narrow issue of
copyright infringement for the Supreme Court arising under the
Copyright Act of 1909 (hereinafter, the "1909 Act").3 The issue
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; B.A.,
Smith College; J.D., Yale University School of Law.
** B.A., University of California, Los Angeles, third year law student at Pepperdine
University School of Law.
The authors offer special thanks to Philip A. Iadevaa, second year law student at
Pepperdine University School of Law, who assisted with the research for this article.
The authors also wish to acknowledge Alan C. Arnall, Esq. for his contribution to this
article.
1. Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750, 1769 (1990), vacating, Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863
F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988). The Ninth Circuit's decision in Abend was in direct conflict with
the Second Circuit's holding in Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 494 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977). Stewart, 110 S. Ct. at 1758.
2. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 485-86. The Second Circuit characterized the issue in Rohauer
as one of first impression. Id. at 485 n.1.
3. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (as amended
1947) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1976)) [hereinafter, The 1909 Act]. See
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presented to the Court in Stewart v. Abend was whether or not the
validity of an author's assignment of rights to renew a copyright 4 in
a derivative work5 (the motion picture Rear Window) based on an
original story by the author runs through only the first copyright
term and not the renewal term unless the author personally files for
the renewal.6 In Stewart, the author's death prevented him from
renewing the copyright.7
The Ninth Circuit had agreed with Abend, the successor to the
author, and declined to follow the Second Circuit's decision in
Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc.,s which had held that the owner of
Colby, Rohauer Revisited: "'Rear Window," Copyright Reversions, Renewals, Terminations,
Derivative Works and Fair Use, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 569, 595 (1986). Colby argues that:
[t]he cause of action in Abend ... arose under the 1909 Act, under which "Rear
window" was created and first released, and under the 1976 Act when defendant
Universal reissued "Rear window" in 1983 .... mhe 1976 Act applies to defen-
dants' rights ... for two reasons: the cause of action arose after the effective date
of [the 1976] Act, and the 1954 motion picture copyright had been renewed in 1982
under the 1976 Act.
Id. If this is so, the 1976 Act's Derivative Works Exception may shield the continued use of
the film. See infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text for a definition and discussion of the
Derivative Works Exception to the 1976 Act.
4. Under the 1909 Act, the initial copyright term runs twenty-eight years. The 1909 Act,
supra note 3, § 23. The right to renew the initial copyright comes into existence "one year
prior to the expiration of the original term of copyright." Id. The renewal term continues for
an additional twenty-eight years. If renewal application is not made in time, the copyright will
expire at the end of the first copyright term. Id. This results in the work falling into the
public domain.
5. Under the 1909 Act, an author's creation may be protected from general use. See
generally infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. An author may license others to use all or
part of the rights reserved under copyright. When such licensing occurs, the author's original
creation becomes an underlying work and any new works developed under this license are
called derivative works. The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. IV
1989) (successor to Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat 1075 (1909))
[hereinafter, The 1976 Act]. A copyrightable work is created under the law;
when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time ... [a] "derivative
work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a ... musical
arrangement, dramatization..., motion picture version, sound recording ... or any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship is a "derivative work."
Id. § 101. When produced with the author's consent, derivative works are also deemed to be
"new works" themselves under the 1909 Act. The 1909 Act, supra note 3 at § 7. As "new"
creations, these derivative works are also "subject to copyright under provisions of [the 1909]
Act .... " Id.
6. See infra Part IV for an outline of the Stewart decision.
7. The Ninth Circuit's decision was primarily grounded upon the 1960 Supreme Court
decision in Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960), which held
that "assignment of renewal rights by an author before the time for renewal arrives cannot
defeat the right of the author's statutory successor to the renewal rights if the author dies
before the right to renewal accrues." Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750, 1757 (1990). See
also Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 485-86 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 949 (1977).
8. 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977).
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a derivative work may continue to use the work according to the
original grant from the underlying work's author, even if the author's
rights in that work have lapsed.9 The Ninth Circuit relied on Miller
Music Corp. v. Charles Daniels, Inc., 0 which, inapposite to Rohauer,
held that the original author of the underlying pre-existing work
must timely renew the copyright before death or lose it to his statutory
successors. "'
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit found that the author's promise to
grant renewed motion picture rights in the story for the film's usage
during the second copyright term to Stewart, Alfred Hitchcock and
others, was merely a contingency present in the original literary
purchase agreement.12 Because the author had died before renewing
the copyright in the story, the Ninth Circuit held that those rights
could not have been contractually vested in petitioners Stewart,
Hitchcock and MCA prior to the author's death. Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit deemed the defendants' continued exploitation of the
film to be an infringement of Abend's copyrights.1
3
In a decision written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, holding that petitioners'
exploitation of the film Rear Window had infringed on Abend's
copyright in the short story "It Had to Be Murder.'
' 4
The majority held that exploitation of a derivative work incorpo-
rating an underlying pre-existing work during the underlying work's
renewal copyright term infringes on the underlying work's copyrights,
if the author of the underlying work died before the beginning of
the renewal period and failed to assign those renewed rights which
9. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1473.
10. 362 U.S. 373 (1960).
11. Id. at 378. "Until [the time to renew copyright registration] arrives, assignees of
renewal rights take the risk that the rights acquired may never vest in their assignors. A
purchaser of such an interest is deprived of nothing. Like all purchasers of contingent interests,
he takes subject to the possibility that the contingency may not occur." Stewart, 110 S. Ct.
at 1757 (reiterating the Supreme Court's holding in Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels,
Inc.).
12. Abend, 863 F.2d 1465, 1476.
If Miller Music makes assignment of the full renewal rights in the underlying
copyright unenforceable when an author dies before effecting renewal of the copy-
right, then a fortiori, an assignment of part of the rights in an underlying work,
the right to produce a movie version, must also be unenforceable if the author dies
before effecting renewal of the underlying copyright.
Id.
13. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1478. See also supra notes 191-207 and accompanying text for a
full discussion of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning.
14. Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750, 1768-69 (1990). See Part IV for an outline of the
Stewart decision.
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engendered the derivative work. 5 The majority declared that no
support existed in either the 1909 Act or the 1976 Act for the
contention that the rights of the owner of a copyright in the derivative
work exist separately from those of the copyright owner of the
underlying pre-existing work.16 The majority reasoned its holding
based on the history of American copyright, 17 the policy behind the
law, 8 past case law interpretation, 9 and general principles of equity.20
Justice Stevens, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia dis-
sented.21
The Court noted that even the earliest copyright statutes contained
specific provisions for an original copyright registration term and a
renewal term. After examining congressional discussion pertaining
to the 1909 Act, the Court concluded that those debates supported
the preservation of renewal rights to protect an author's bargaining
power 23 and to ensure security for his or her family in the event of
the author's death.2 Commenting on the congressional policy behind
15. Stewart, 110 S. Ct. at 1768. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated, that
"In this case, the grant of rights in the pre-existing work lapsed, and, therefore, the derivative
work owner's rights to use those portions of the pre-existing work incorporated into the
derivative work expired. Thus, continued use would be infringing ... ." Id.
16. Id. at 1758, 1763. "They [petitioners] argue in essence that the rights of the owner
of the copyright in the derivative use of the pre-existing work are extinguished once it is
incorporated into the derivative work, assuming the author of the pre-existing work has agreed
to assign his renewal rights. Id. at 1758 (emphasis added). It is interesting to note that Justice
O'Connor characterized the dispute in terms of use of rights, similar to an easement across
real property, as opposed to a contractual agreement to sell the right to create a different
commercially viable product. See id. at 1759. This characterization views the derivative motion
picture as merely an extension of the underlying short story under copyright law.
17. See infra notes 31-149 and accompanying text for further discussion of American
copyright history.
18. See infra notes 243-46 and accompanying text (discussing policy considerations iden-
tified by the Court). See also infra notes 250-79 and accompanying text for further policy
discussion.
19. See infra notes 236-42 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court interpretation
of past case law). See also infra notes 65-149 and accompanying text (outlining the development
of case law).
20. See infra notes 244-46 and accompanying text (describing principles of equity espoused
by the Supreme Court). See also infra notes 250-79 and accompanying text for further
discussion.
21. Id. at 1769.
22. Id. at 1758.
23. Id. at 1759. "It not infrequently happens that the author sells his copyright outright
to a publisher for a comparatively small sum." Id. (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong.,
2d Sess., 14 (1909)). If the work proves to be a great success and lives beyond the term of
twenty-eight years .... it should be the exclusive right of the author to take the renewal term,
and the law should be framed ... so that [the author] could not be deprived of that right.
Id.
24. Id. at 1758-59 (citing De Slyva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 582 (1956)). See also Fred
Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 651 (1943) (should an author die
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the 1909 Act, the majority noted that "[t]he renewal term permits
the author, originally in a poor bargaining position, to renegotiate
the terms of the grant once the value of the work has been tested. ' 25
In order to ground the reader in the statutory constraints of
copyright, Part I of this Article reviews the history of United States
copyright law. Part II provides an overview of the evolution of case
law interpreting the 1909 Act and the Copyright Act of 1976 (here-
inafter, the 1976 Act) prior to Rohauer. This case law analysis is
necessary to understand how the law of copyright has been applied
to facts analogous to those in Abend. Part III breaks down the
copyright issue before the Court as presented in the facts and holdings
of both Abend and Rohauer. Part IV highlights the Supreme Court's
holding in Stewart v. Abend; Part V elaborates on the Court's
decision, and finally, Part VI discusses the policy considerations and
ramifications resulting from the Supreme Court's decision.
I. THE COPYRIGHT ACTS OF 1909 AND 1976
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to create
a limited monopoly under the law in favor of authors and inventors. 26
The purpose of the monopoly is to encourage creative individuals by
rewarding them financially for products which benefit society as a
whole.27 This monopoly is called a copyright.n Thus, American
copyright law has two main objectives. The first is to reward indi-
vidual creativity and ingenuity directly by remunerating creators. 29
prior to the beginning of the copyright renewal period, "his family stand[s] in more need of
the only means of subsistence ordinarily left to them.") (citation omitted).
25. Stewart, 110 S. Ct. at 1759 (citing 2 M. NnnIER & D. NIMMR, NIUOaR ON CoPYxRo
§ 9.02, at 9-23 (1989)).
26. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Section 8 states in pertinent part: "Congress shall
have the Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." Id. The length of copyright protection under the 1909 Act was an initial term
of twenty-eight years. The 1909 Act, supra note 3, § 23. This.term could be extended for an
additional twenty-eight years. The 1976 Act altered the duration of copyright. It did away
with the two term system in favor of a single term lasting for the life of the author plus an
additional 50 years. See The 1976 Act, supra note 5, § 302(a).
27. See Chaffee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 CoLtm. L. REv. 503, 506
(1945); Reflections on the Law of Copyright: II, 45 CoLuM. L. REv. 719 (1945) (Chaffee's
article is printed in two parts).
28. Id. at 506.
29. Id. at 507. "The principle of copyright is this. It is a tax on readers for the purpose
of giving a bounty to writers." Id. (quoting Macaulay, Copyright in 8 WoRKs 195, 197
(Trevelyan ed. 1879) (1841 speech in House of Commons)).
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The second objective is to promote the public good indirectly by
making these creative products available for general use and enjoy-
ment.3 0
The scope of copyright protection is dictated by statute. 3' The
language and intent of the 1909 Act and the 1976 Act must first be
understood to better comprehend the issues addressed by the Supreme
Court in Stewart.32 Under the 1909 Act, the provision relating to the
creation of derivative copyrights3 3 states that dramatizations of cop-
yrighted works34 "when produced with the consent of the proprietor
of the copyright" in such an underlying work are "new works subject
to copyright. ' 3- The creation of this new derivative work does not
affect subsisting copyrights protecting underlying works. 36 A deriva-
tive work, by its definition, represents "an original work of author-
30. Id. at 506-07, 516. Chaffee notes that the interests of authors and the general public
are balanced by operation of copyright law. Id. at 516.
31. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247, 248 (1st Cir. 1911). For a general
history of the development of American copyright law, see Bricker, Renewal and Extension
of Copyright, 29 S. CAL. L. Rav. 23, 24 (1955). The first copyright act was the English Statute
of Anne which provided an initial copyright term of fourteen years after which all printing
and publishing rights returned to the author, if living, for an additional fourteen years. Id. at
24. The first American federal legislation to create a copyright was passed in 1790 and provided
authors with an initial term of fourteen years of copyright protection. Act of May 31, 1790,
1 Stat. 124 (1790). Following the original term, the author or, if the author had died, his
executor, administrators or assigns, could renew the copyright protection for an additional
fourteen year period. Bricker, supra, at 24. This "renewal privilege, like any other property,
tracked the author's estate or his inter vivos transfers." Id. The Act of 1831 increased the
original copyright term to twenty-eight years and gave the right to apply for renewal to the
author, or, if the author was dead, to the author's widow and children. Act of February 3,
1831, ch. 26, 4 Stat. 436 (1831). This legislation was a major revision in copyright law in that
the copyright no longer followed the author's estate or inter vivos transfers but flowed to his
spouse and heirs. Bricker, supra, at 24. The Copyright Act of 1909 was the "last major
revision of the copyright law." Id. The 1909 Act increased the renewal term to twenty-eight
years. The 1909 Act, supra note 3, § 23. The 1909 Act also eliminated an author's assignees
from the line of statutory succession to the renewal copyright. Id.
32. See The 1909 Act, supra note 3; The 1976 Act, supra note 5.
33. The 1909 Act, supra note 3, § 7. The 1909 Act as originally enacted numbered this
provision regarding derivative copyrights as section 6. By the Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 391,
61 Stat. 655, the provision was codified in Title 17 of the United States Code numbered at
section 7. See 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1976). This provision will be referred to as section 7 throughout
this Article.
34. A dramatization of a protected work is one method of creating a derivative product
of that underlying work. The 1909 Act, supra note 3, § 7. To qualify for separate copyright
protection, the dramatic product must have been created pursuant to consent from the owner
of the protected underlying work. Absent consent, such a dramatization infringes on the
underlying work's copyright. Id.
35. Id. (emphasis added). "[Plublication of any such new works shall not affect the force
or validity of any subsisting copyright upon the matter employed or any part thereof, or be
construed to imply an exclusive right to such use of the original works, or to secure or extend
copyright in such original works." Id.
36. Id. § 23.
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ship" and, as such, is eligible for separate copyright protection under
section 7 of the 1909 Copyright Act. 37 Section 23 of the 1909 Act
provides for an initial copyright term of twenty-eight years which
begins on the date of first publication of the original work.38 The
1909 Act grants authors the right to renew, and therefore to extend,
the copyright in their works for an additional twenty-eight years. 39
Application for the renewal must be made "one year prior to the
expiration of the original term of copyright." 4
Section 24 of the 1909 Act explains how an author may exercise
his renewal rights. At the expiration of the initial copyright term,
the copyright may be renewed and extended by the author, if living,
"or [by] the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author
be not living, or if such author, widow, widower, or children be not
living, then by the author's executors, or in the absence of a will,
his next of kin." '41
Once registered, the renewal copyright term is not actually a
renewal or extension of copyright protection. "It is a new right,
completely independent of the property in the original copyright. ' 42
The renewal grants a new estate, free from all other previous rights,
interests or licenses transferred under the original copyright. 43 The
renewal term provides the author and other parties listed in sections
23 and 24 of the 1909 Act with a means by which the author and
his heirs may obtain a "second chance" to benefit from the success
of the original work. 44
37. Id. § 7.
38. Id. § 23. "First publication" is not defined by the 1909 Act. Black's Law Dictionary
defines "publication" in connection with copyright law as "[tihe act of making public a book,
writing, chart, map, etc.; that is, offering or communicating it to the public by the sale or
distribution of copies." BLACK's LAW DiCTONARY 1105 (5th ed. 1979).
39. The 1909 Act, supra note 3, § 23.
40. Id.
41. Id. §24.
42. Bricker, supra note 31, at 27 (citation omitted). See G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir. 1951); Fitch v. Shubert, 20 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y.
1937). See generally I M. NIM R, NnMER ON COPYgIUGT § 3.07[A], 3-23 to 3-24 (1989).
43. Bricker, supra note 31, at 27-28.
44. Id. at 27. See Mills Music Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 172-73 (congressional policy
of protecting authors from the free market); White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Goff, 187 F.
247, 249 (Ist Cir. 1911). The Supreme Court noted that the termination right contained in
section 304 of the 1976 Act illustrates an express intent by Congress to provide continued
protection to authors. Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 172. "The purpose of the [Derivative Works]
Exception was to 'preserve the right of the owner of a derivative work to exploit it,
notwithstanding the reversion."' Id. at 173 (quoting Further Discussions and Comments on
Preliminary Draft for Revised U.S. Copyright Law, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., Copyright Law
Revision, Part 4 (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 1964) at 39 (statement of Barbara Ringer)).
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The law creates a right to alienate property twice in order to
compensate for what is perceived to be an author's weak bargaining
position by virtue of the work's untested value, and for the inherent
special nature of intellectual property that cannot always be fairly
evaluated at the time the author enters into the sale of rights. 45 By
allowing a second transfer of a property right, copyright law accom-
plishes the first of its two main objectives: to encourage creativity
by financially rewarding authors for their popularity.
46
Congress did away with the renewal term of the 1909 Act when it
enacted the 1976 Act.47 The 1976 Act created a single copyright term
"consisting of the life of the author plus fifty years after the author's
death." 48 Nevertheless, the purpose of the 1909 renewal term was
preserved under the 1976 Act as a right to terminate a previous grant
of copyright. 49 The 1976 Act requires an author to serve advance
notice to the grantees within specified time limits announcing his
intention to terminate the grant of rights.50 Absent such affirmative
action by the author, the renewal rights remain with the grantees."
Under the 1976 Act, all rights previously conveyed to the grantees
revert to the author or other persons owning termination interests
once termination becomes effective,5 2 except for certain limitations.
5 3
These limitations include "a derivative work prepared under authority
of the grant before its termination." 5 4 The 1976 Act refers to this
45. Comment, Derivative Copyright and the 1909 Act-New Clarity or Confusion?, 44
BROOKLYN L. REV. 905, 914 (1978). See also Note, Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc. and The
Derivative Work Exception to the Termination Right: Inequitable Anomalies Under Copyright
Law, 52 S. CAL. L. Ray. 635, 647 (1979).
46. Chaffee, supra note 27, at 506. Chaffee notes, "the wish to provide for one's widow
and children is one of the strongest incentives to work for all human beings." Id. at 508.
Chaffee further observes that while the author's family benefits from the assignment of the
copyright renewal, it is less able than the author to decide how best to utilize the copyright
monopoly. Id. See White-Smith, 187 F. at 251; Bricker, supra note 31, at 27. Bricker comments
that "[t]he purpose of the second term, at least since the act of 1831 when the right of
assignees to the renewal was deleted, is to protect the author and those naturally dependant
upon his bounty from the supposed imprudence of authors in business matters." Id.
47. See The 1976 Act, supra note 5.
48. Id. § 203(a).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 203(a)(5). This termination privilege may not be waived or limited by any
agreement to the contrary. Id.
51. Id. The 1909 Act required no such affirmative action for an author to reclaim his
renewal rights. The right to renew copyrights vested in the author automatically upon the
expiration of the initial copyright term. The 1909 Act, supra note 3, § 23.
52. The 1976 Act, supra note 5, § 203(a)(l)-(2).
53. Id. § 203(b)(I)-(6).
54. The 1976 Act, supra note 5, § 203(b)(1). For the pertinent text, see infra note 55.
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limitation as the "Derivative Works Exception. ' 55 A derivative work
may continue to be utilized after the effective date of termination
under the terms of license authorizing the use of such derivative
work.5 6 However, this privilege of continued utilization does not
extend to the creation of other derivative works based on the original
copyrighted work after the effective date of termination.5 7 A proposed
amendment to this derivative works exception would have empowered
an author to affirmatively reclaim his work and receive additional
remuneration.5 8
Section 304(c) of the 1976 Act details how an author or other
interested party terminates a grant or license executed before the
1976 Act.59 This section provides that the author's rights covered by
the terminated grant revert to the author or, if the author is dead,
to the author's successor in interest 0
The 1976 Act, however, limited the reversion of rights in derivative
works to an author in section 304(c)(6)(A). 1 Like section 203, section
55. The 1976 Act, supra note 5, § 203(b)(1). The Derivative Works Exception states:
Upon the effective date of termination all rights ... revert to the author ... but
with the following limitation[s]: ... A derivative work prepared under authority of
the grant before its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the
grant after its termination, but this privilege does not extend to the preparation after
the termination of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered
by the terminated grant.
Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. See supra note 55 (text of the Derivative Works Exception).
58. See H.R. 3163, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). The proposed amended provided:
(I) A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its termination
may after the effective date of termination, continue to be utilized under the terms
of the license or other contract which authorizes the use of such derivative work.
After the effective date of termination, all rights to enforce the terms of any such
license or other contract and to receive royalties or other monies from any such
continued utilization shall become the property of, and such royalties or other monies
shall be payable to, the person or persons in whom the reversion of rights of
continued utilization of a derivative work does not extend to the preparation after
the termination of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered
by the terminated grant.
Id.
59. Id. § 304(c).
60. Id. § 304(c)(2).
61. Id. at § 304(c)(6)(A). Section 304(c)(6)(A) provides:
A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its termination may
continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its termination, but this
privilege of continued utilization of a derivative work does not extend to the
preparation after the termination of other derivative works based upon the copy-
righted work covered by the terminated grant.
Id. Compare id. with The 1976 Act, supra note 5, § 203(b)(1). On June 27, 1985, Congress
considered and rejected an amendment to Section 304(c), which provided:
(7) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, where an author or his successor,
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304(c)(6)(A) provides an exception for derivative works. 62 It entitles
grantees to continue utilizing the derivative works under the terms
of a license after the effective date of the termination of the author's
grant. 63 However, this "privilege [of continued utilization of .a deriv-
ative work] does not extend to the preparation after the termination
of [the license] other derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work covered by the terminated grant." 64 This language secures the
author's right to relicense the copyright and collect any royalties
from grantees; however, it does not enjoin the grantees' continued
exploitation of the derivative work created by the original grant.
II. ASSIGNABILITY OF RENEWAL COPYRIGHTS UNDER CASE LAW
PRIOR TO Rohauer
Under the 1909 Act, an author may transfer to a third party all
his interest in a copyright during an initial twenty-eight year term.
65
Without more, the assignment terminates at the end of the contracted
period or when the initial copyright term ends. 6 Likewise, an author
may sell renewal copyright on a work to a third party, provided that
the author has already properly extended the copyright term. 67 Neither
situation creates a conflict in copyright law. Prior to Rohauer the
question presented in several cases was whether or not the author
may assign the renewal interest in the work before actually renewing
the copyright. 68 Federal courts have interpreted the 1909 Act to
permit, and alternatively to deny, an assignment of renewal rights
as defined in subsection (c)(2), has exercised a right of termination pursuant to this
section and a derivative work continues to be utilized pursuant to subsection (c)(6)(A)
of this section, any right to royalties from the utilization of the derivative work
shall revert to the person exercising the termination right.
S.1384, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., (July 27, 1985). Such language would have effectively limited
grantees' continued exploration of any derivative works created under the original grant by
granting to the author the right to demand royalties.
62. The 1976 Act supra note 5, § 304(c)(6)(A).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 203(b)(1).
65. The 1909 Act, supra note 3, § 24. See Bricker, supra note 31, at 27.
66. G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir. 1951).
67. The 1909 Act, supra note 3, § 23.
[T]he proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of
the copyright in such work for the further term of twenty-eight years when application
for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the copyright office and
duly registered therein within one year prior to the expiration of the original term
of copyright.
Id.
68. See infra note 69 and cases cited therein predating January, 1977.
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made before the beginning of the renewal term.6 9 In Rohauer the
Second Circuit held that the 1909 Act allows an author to contrac-
tually assign an inchoate statutory right to renew a derivative work's
copyright.70 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Abend held that the
1909 Act does not permit an author to transfer such rights. 71 The
Ninth Circuit viewed the promise to assign the renewal interest in a
derivative work as a contingency until the renewal rights come into
existence under the 1909 Act.7 2 An author's death preceding the
beginning of the derivative work's renewal term causes such rights
to revert to persons designated under the 1909 Act. 73 For reasons of
copyright policy, the renewal rights in the derivative work become
free and clear of any previous contractual assignments upon an
author's death. 74
The Supreme Court's decision to review Abend suggested an intent
to resolve the conflict between the Second and Ninth Circuits. If an
assignment of an inchoate renewal right was held valid, the author
would no longer control the work during its renewal copyright
period.7 5 However, if an assignment is considered premature, and
69. Those cases which have restrained assignability are: Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N.
Daniels, 362 U.S. 373 (1960); White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Goff, 187 U.S. 247 (1911);
Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Charles K. Harris Music Pub. Co., 255 F.2d 518 (2d Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 831 (1958); Fitch v. Shubert, 20 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
Those cases ruling in favor of assignability are: Fred Fisher v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S.
643 (1943); Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985) (ruling made pursuant to the
confines of the 1976 Act and is thus not controlling authority); Edmond v. Stem, 248 F.2d
897 (2d Cir. 1918); Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied
431 U.S. 949 (1977); G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (the Ricordi court recognized the ability of an author to
assign the renewal term, but denied assignment because the contract in question was silent as
to the author's intent to assign such renewal rights).
70. Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 492 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 949 (1977).
71. Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1472-73 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd, in Stewart v.
Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750 (1989).
72. Id. at 1475. "[Aln assignment of full renewal rights by an author prior to the time
for renewal ... cannot defeat the right of the author's successor ... when the author dies
before the time that the right for renewal has accrued." Id. (citing Miller Music Corp. v.
Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960)).
73. The author must register the renewal in his own name if he is still living. The 1909
Act, supra note 3, § 24; White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247, 249 (1st Cir. 1911).
See Bricker, supra note 31, at 27. The author, if living, may nevertheless grant to the copyright
proprietor the right to renew. Id. If the author has died, then the widow, widower or children
are next in line to renew the copyright. The 1909 Act, supra note 3, §§ 23-24. The author's
executor follows these immediate heirs. Id. If the author has left no will, then the author's
next of kin may renew the copyright. Id. An author's assignees are excluded from the statutory
line of succession. Id.
74. Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465 1476-78 (9th Cir. 1988).
75. See Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960); White-Smith
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thus ineffective, control in the renewal copyright term would revert
to the author. 76
A. A Single Work And The Assignment Of Its Renewal
Copyright.
Two primary divisions emerge in the pertinent case law: those
cases involving a single work and the assignment of its renewal
copyright, and those cases involving the renewal copyrights of two
works-an underlying work and its derivative product. The question
in each group of cases centers on the time of the author's assignment.
The following cases illustrate the alternate positions federal courts
have taken with regard to the assignability of a copyright renewal
term. All of these cases determine the rights of parties with respect
to one copyrighted work; no derivative work is involved. These case
holdings concerning assignability of renewal copyrights provide a
springboard for determining whether inchoate rights in a derivative
work's copyright are transferable.
1. Renewal Copyright Assigned Before Renewal Rights In The
Work Have Vested.
In Fox Films Corp. v. Knowles,77 the author of two poems died
three years prior to the beginning of the renewal term in the works,
leaving no heirs. The Supreme Court held that the author's executor
could step into the shoes of the author and renew the copyright for
three years. 78 The Court found that Congress had intended to em-
power the executor with the authority to renew the copyright if the
Music Publishing Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247 (1911); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Charles
K. Harris Music Pub. Co., 255 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1958); Fitch v. Shubart, 20 F. Supp. 314
(S.D.N.Y. 1937).
76. See Fred Fisher v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943); Mills Music v. Snyder,
469 U.S. 153 (1985) (ruling made pursuant to the confines of the 1976 Act and is thus not
controlling authority); Edmond v. Stem, 248 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1918); Rohauer v. Killiam
Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977).
77. 261 U.S. 326 (1923) (bill in equity to prevent dramatic performances of author's
poems). The author's executor renewed copyrights in two poems in 1915, three years after the
author's death. Exclusive dramatic rights in the poems were assigned to plaintiff Fox Films.
Defendant Knowles sought to enjoin Fox Films from dramatizing the poems, arguing that the
author had to survive until the beginning of the renewal term before any transferable renewal
interest accrued. Id. at 328-29.
78. Id. at 328-29.
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author died before personally applying for copyright renewal. 79 Al-
lowing the executor to renew the copyright prevented the protected
work from falling into the public domain merely by operation of a
technicality in the law. The Court's holding in Fox Films can be
interpreted to mean that, even before the beginning of the renewal
period for copyright created by the 1909 Act, an author has a
property interest to bequeath, regardless of whether or not proper
application for copyright renewal has been made before his death.80
Fox Films did not discuss whether an author could assign the
renewal copyright interest prior to the beginning of the twenty-eighth
year of the initial term. The Court settled this issue in favor of
assignability in Fred Fisher v. M. Witmark & Sons.8 ' Fisher was the
first case to recognize that an author may assign an inchoate right
to the renewal copyright term during the initial copyright period.8 2
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority in Fisher, concluded
that the 1909 Act does not void agreements by authors to assign
their renewal interests .8  Addressing the policy to protect authors
from the effects of the free market, Justice Frankfurter refused to
create an absolute statutory bar to such assignments for several
reasons. 84 The foremost reason was that a complete ban on assigning
renewal interests prior to the renewal period implied a finding that
all authors are so incapable of conducting their own financial affairs
that they require special judicial protection.85 The Court also observed
that preventing an author from ever making an assignment of his
79. Id. at 329. Referring to section 24 of the 1909 Act, the Court in Fox Film stated
"[t]he section read as a whole would express to the ordinary reader a general intent to secure
the continuance of the copyright after the author's death . . . ." Id.
80. Id. at 329. See Bricker, supra note 31, at 29.
81. 318 U.S. 643 (1943) (contractual agreement to assign copyright renewal rights in the
song "When Irish Eyes are Smiling"). An assignment of renewal rights made prior to the
beginning of the renewal period was deemed valid under the 1909 Act. Id. at 647.
82. Id. at 647.
83. Id. at 657 (the 1909 Act "does not nullify agreements by authors to assign their
renewal interests").
84. Id. at 656-57.
85. Id. Frankfurter writes:
We are asked to recognize that authors are congenitally irresponsible, that frequently
they are so sorely pressed for funds that they are willing to sell their work for a
mere pittance, and therefore assignments made by them should not be upheld ....
It is one thing to hold that the courts should not make themselves instruments of
injustice by lending their aid to the enforcement of an agreement where the author
was under such coercion of circumstances that enforcement would be unconscionable.
It is quite another matter to hold ... that regardless of the circumstances surrounding
a particular assignment, no agreements by authors to assign their renewal interests
are binding.
Id.
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renewal right may compromise the author's ability to sell his work.86
Justice Frankfurter noted that authors are not powerless to protect
their interests. 87 Finally, the majority pointed out that, in. actual
practice, authors would assign renewal rights under a good faith
assumption that such a transaction was valid. 8 Thus, the protectionist
policy inherent in the dual renewal terms of the 1909 Act was set
aside in favor of individual freedom of contract.
89
According to this line of case law arising out of Fisher, an author's
affirmative and clear intent to assign operates to convey the renewal
term. Courts will not assume an assignment of renewal rights if the
author fails to specify an intent to assignP° Failure to manifest a
clear intent to assign the renewal copyright term results in the renewal
copyright reverting to the author under the 1909 Act. 9'
2. Renewal Copyright May Not Be Assigned Before The
Beginning Of The Statutory Renewal Term.
This second line of cases emphasizes the protectionist policy of the
1909 Act favoring the author. Although there may be no express
statutory bar to assignment of author's renewal interest in original
materials according to Fox Films and other cases, an assignment may
divest an author of rights otherwise safeguarded for his benefit by
the 1909 Act.
The First Circuit's decision in White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v.
Goff2 is the first significant judicial interpretation of the 1909 Act. 93
86. Id. at 657. "If an author cannot make an effective assignment of his renewal, it may
be useless to him when he is most in need [because no] one would pay an author for something
he cannot sell." Id.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 658.
89. It should be noted that in Fisher, the author expressed his intent to assign his renewal
interest in the contract. Id. at 645 (author transferred "all rights, title and interest" as well
as "all copyrights and renewals of copyrights"). The Second Circuit, in interpreting Fisher,
has recognized that, where such renewal rights are not expressly granted, any rights assigned
will end with the initial copyright term. G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount, 189 F.2d 469, 471
(2d Cir. 1951).
90. G. Ricordi, 189 F.2d at 471.
91. See supra note 3.
92. 187 F. 247 (1st Cir. 1911).
93. The first copyright case was Pierpont v. Fowle, 19 Fed. Cas. 653 (1846). The second
case was Paige v. Banks, 80 U.S. 608 (13 Wall) (1870). Both rulings were made according to
the rules expressed in prior copyright acts. The work in question in Pierpont was copyrighted
in 1837 and renewed in 1841. Thus, the case was governed by the Copyright Act of 1831. See
Act of February 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436, 439 (1831). The copyright issue in Paige was
likewise governed by the Copyright Act of 1831. White-Smith, 187 F. at 253.
1990 / Shattering Copyright Law
Publishers of a musical composition claimed an extension of copy-
right under contractual assignment from the author. 94 In dicta, the
First Circuit stated that the Copyright Act of 179095 granted the
power of copyright renewal to an author, his executor, administrators
or his assigns. 96 The court reasoned that the renewal term was
originally an extension of the initial monopoly, and, like other
property interests, was subject to rules dictating property devolution. 97
Congress excluded assigns from the list of those eligible for renewal
under the Copyright Act of 1831 .98 The First Circuit viewed this
omission of assignees as indicative of Congress' intent to establish a
new copyright policy, 99 and interpreted the effect of the exclusion as
severing normal devolvement of title from assigns and vesting "an
absolutely new title eo nomine in the persons designated."' 10
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court in Miller Music
Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels'0' ruled that an assignment of renewal
copyrights by an author, if eiecuted prior to expiration of the original
copyright period, is valid, provided "the author is alive at the
commencement of the renewal period."102 In Miller the court consid-
ered whether, under section 24 of the 1909 Act, the renewal rights
of an original work devolve to the author's executor in spite of an
author's prior assignment to a third party.103 Because one of the co-
authors of a song died prior to the expiration of the original copyright
in the work, the Court deemed his assignment of the renewal period
invalid. 104 In Miller Music, the Court found only an expectancy to
assign renewal copyrights because those rights had not yet come into
existence under the 1909 Act. 05 Thus, the author could not assign
94. White-Smith, 187 F. at 249-50.
95. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
96. White-Smith, 187 F. at 250.
97. Id.
98. Copyright Act of 1831, at 4 Stat. 436, 439.
99. White-Smith, 187 U.S. at 250.
100. Id. at 249. "In connection with the renewal, the persons who control the right thereto
... may, during the year prior to the expiration of the existing term nominated in section 24,
assign the right to renewal, so that the then proprietor may make the new registration required
and take out the extension in his own name." Id.
101. 362 U.S. 373 (1960), see also supra note 7.
102. Miller Music, 362 U.S. at 375.
103. Id. at 374.
104. Id. at 375. "An assignment by an author of his renewal rights made before the
original copyright expires is valid against the world, if the author is alive at the commencement
of the renewal period." Id. (citation omitted).
105. Id. at 375. "It is clear that under [the Copyright Act of 1909] the executor's right to
renew is independent of the author's rights at the time of his death. What Congress has done
by § 24 is to create contingent renewal rights." Id. at 376. The Court quoted the following
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his rights because those rights, dictated by the 1909 Act, did not yet
exist.'0 The dissent in Miller Music, authored by Justice Harlan,
noted that the "effect of the decision is to enable an author who
has sold his renewal rights during his lifetime to defeat the transaction
by a deliberate subsequent bequest of those rights to others in his
will." 1°7 The consequence of such a defeat of assignment is to deprive
an assignee of the protection of a lasting conveyance of renewal
rights. 108
from the House Report material accompanying the 1909 legislation:
Instead of confining the right of renewal to the author, if still living, or to the
widow or children of the author, if he be dead, we provide that the author of such
work, if still living, may apply for the renewal, or the widow, widower, or children
of the author, if the author be not living, or if such author, widow, widower, or
children be not living, then the author's executors, or, in the absence of a will, his
next of kin. It was not the intention to permit the administrator to apply for the
renewal, but to permit the author who had no wife or children to bequeath by will
the right to apply for the renewal.
Id. at 377 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., at 15) (also citing to S. REP.
No. 1108, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., at 15). The Court interpreted section 24 of the 1909 Act to
reflect "a consistent policy to treat renewal rights as expectancies until the renewal period
arrives." Id. at 377. The Court explained that:
[w]hen that time arrives, the renewal rights pass to one of the four classes listed in
§ 24 according to the then-existing circumstances. Until that time arrives, assignees
of renewal rights take the risk that the rights acquired may never vest in their
assignors. A purchaser of such an interest is deprived of nothing .... Whether it
works at times an injustice is a matter for the Congress, not for us.
Id. at 377-78.
106. Id. at 375. "It is clear that under [the Copyright Act of 1909] the executor's right to
renew is independent of the author's rights at the time of his death. What Congress has done
by § 24 is to create contingent renewal rights." Id. at 376.
107. Id. at 378 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 379 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan noted:
[t]he resulting uncertainties as to construction, validity, and mode of enforcement
of such transactions .. . [produce] [a] result so unjust and unsettling, and which
indeed may impair the marketability of an author's renewal rights, [that such an
interpretation] should be reached only if clear statutory language or evident legislative
purpose fairly compels it.
Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan also argued that:
tampering with the rules of succession to place next of kin above assignees ignores
the legislative purpose of the statute ... [f]or the obvious fact that under the statute
next of kin, though related ... to the author, may be deprived of any interest in
the renewal rights by a bequest of those rights by the author to another. It is thus
apparent that Congress had no intention of protecting next of kin from defeasance
of their expectancy.
Id. at 382 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan continued:
Consistently with Fisher, the assignment is given effect as against those whose claims
must rest on the voluntary decision of the author to benefit them; as to the surviving
spouse and children, however, the legislative care taken to make their rights inde-
pendent of the author's desires leads to a contrary result.
Id. at 383 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Cf. Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.
1977); Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988) (while the successor in Rohauer
was a relative, the successor in Abend was the unrelated beneficiary of unrelated executors).
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Fitch v. Shubert'09 and Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Charles
K. Harris Music Publishing Co.1 0 reiterate the doctrine that a renewal
copyright exists as a separate property interest distinct from the
original copyright term in the work."' If an author conveys the
original copyright without proof of the author's express intent to
convey renewal rights, the renewal rights do not accompany the
conveyance.1 2 In both cases, the license was limited to the original
copyright terms." 3
B. Renewal Copyrights Of Two Works-An Underlying Work
And Its Derivative Product.
According to the 1909 Act, a derivative work is a new work subject
to copyright protection separate from the underlying work upon
which it is based." 4 However, the 1909 Act did not clarify whether
an author of the underlying work could lay claim to the derivative
work's renewal period. The following cases discuss the assignability
of this renewal interest.
Edmond v. Stern"5 stands for the proposition that a new property
right is created once a derivative work is produced by the consent
of the owner of the underlying property." 6 This new property interest
permits the proprietor of the renewal copyright to use the material
from the underlying work contained in the derivative work even if
109. 20 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
110. 255 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1958).
111. Id. at 521 (citing G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (2d
Cir. 1951)); Fitch, 20 F. Supp. at 315 (an author's statutory successor obtains "a new and
independent right in the copyright, free and clear of any rights, interests, or licenses attached
to the copyright for the initial term").
112. Marks Music, 255 F.2d at 521 (citing G. Ricordi, 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1951)). Neither
Fitch nor Marks involved a grant of renewal rights. Fitch, 20 F. Supp. at 314 (No mention
made in the facts that the Shuberts ever bargained for the renewal term). Marks Music, 255
F.2d at 520-21.
113. Colby, supra note 3, at 584.
The notion of a "new and independent right in the copyright [renewal], free and
clear of any right, interests, or licenses attached to the copyright for the initial
term" (Judge Patterson in Fitch), and the statement that the "cases are clear that
a copyright renewal creates a separate interest distinct from the original copyright"
(Judge Clark in Marks Music) ought to be reexamined by careful analysis of the
facts to determine whether renewal rights were even implicated, and whether facts
similar to those of Rohauer or the "Rear Window" litigation were present.
Id.
114. The 1909 Act, supra note 3, § 7.
115. 248 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1918).
116. Id. at 898.
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consent is later revoked. 1 7 Edmond dissolves any claim by the author
to the derivative work's renewal. However, Melville Nimmer has
criticized this "new property" theory as contrary to the basic pro-
tectionist principle of the 1909 Act, because the theory divests from
an author the right to participate in the profits and the control of
the derivative work, engendered by the author's underlying work."'
Interpreting the Supreme Court's holding in Fisher, the Second
Circuit in G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc." 9 stated
that while "an author has the power to assign his right of renewal
during the term of the original copyright, no one suggested that
rights assigned under the original copyright did not end with it, if
nothing was said of renewal."1 20 The Court decided that these rights
terminate if no express contractual intent to assign exists.1
2
'
The Ninth Circuit decision in Russell v. Price22 affirmed the
opposing doctrine that "a derivative copyright protects only the new
material contained in the derivative work, not the matter derived
from the underlying work."' However, the issue in Russell did not
involve a battle for control of a film's copyright between the statutory
successors of an author and his contractual assignees. 24 Rather, the
issue presented to the court was whether or not a film in the public
domain may be distributed without infringing the underlying play's
renewal copyright. 12
117. Id. For a general defense of the "new property right" theory, see Jaszi, When Works
Collide: Derivative Motion Pictures, Underlying Rights, and the Public Interest, 28 UCLA L.
REv. 715 (1981). But cf. I M. NIOMR, supra note 42, § 3.07[A] at 3-24 to 3-25 ("This
conclusion [that a new property right springs into existence] is neither warranted by any express
provision of the [1909] Act, nor by any rationale as to the scope of protection achieved in a
derivative work").
118. 1 M. NIBRAE, supra note 42, § 3.07[A] at 3-24 to 3-25 (1989).
119. 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1951).
120. Id. at 471 (emphasis added). Ricordi claimed exclusive motion picture rights in the
opera "Madame Butterfly" by operation of contract. The defendant, successor in interest to
Long (the author of the book) and Belasco (the author of the play), claimed motion picture
rights in the Long novel and in the Belasco version, maintaining that Ricordi must obtain its
consent for any motion picture version. Having found that the contract in question did not
grant a renewal copyright term, the court barred Ricordi from utilizing material contained in
Long's novel as a basis for his motion picture. Id. at 471. The court permitted Ricordi to
utilize the new material contained in Belasco's play because the material had fallen into public
domain for failure to renew the copyright. Id. at 471-72.
121. Id. at 471-72.
122. 612 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1979).
123. Id. at 1128. George Bernard Shaw authored the stage play "Pygmalion" in 1913.
Shaw survived to renew the play's copyright in 1941. This renewal, which would have terminated
in 1969, was extended by congressional action until 1988. Shaw licensed the 1938 production
of a derivative film of the play. The renewal copyright in the film was inexplicably not renewed
causing the film to fall into the public domain in 1966. Id. at 1125.
124. Colby, supra note 3, at 597.
125. Id.
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In Russell, the Ninth Circuit held that the owners of a play by
George Bernard Shaw could enjoin any additional exhibitions of the
film adaptation of the play even though the film's copyright had
been allowed to fall into the public domain.126 The court noted that,
since the film was in the public domain, the conflict created by
sections 7 and 24 of the 1909 Act (granting "overlapping 'exclusive
rights' ')I27 no longer existed. 128 Although the court in Russell criti-
cized the Second Circuit's reasoning in Rohauer, it took great care
to distinguish the "significant differences" between Russell and Ro-
hauer.129
In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.y,10 ABC's
editing of a Monty Python episode contravened contractual provisions
restricting the exercise of these editing rights.' 3' The Second Circuit
stated that "[o]ne who obtains permission to use a copyrighted script
in the production of a derivative work ... may not exceed the
specific purpose for which permission was granted.' 1 32 The court
also noted that infringement of an underlying work may nevertheless
occur because of a licensee's work since the underlying copyright
"survives intact" even when parts of the original material have been
included in the derivative product.133 As a foundation for this state-
ment, the Second Circuit noted that section 7 of the 1909 Act restricts
the scope of copyright protection in a derivative work to new and
original contributions to the underlying material. 134
126. Russell, 612 F.2d at 1128.
127. Comment, Derivative Copyright, supra note 45, at 912.
128. Russell, 612 F.2d at 1128.
129. Id. at 1126-28. The court commented on three major differences between Russell and
Rohauer. The first was the author's clear intent to convey the bargained for renewal interest.
In Rohauer, there was such express intent and bargaining, however, in Russell, there was
neither. Id. at 1126. Second, Killiam was in a direct line of privity with those who had
contributed to the film's creation. Killiam had paid them for the proprietary right in the film's
copyright. The defendants in Russell had not contributed in any way to the creation of the
film in question. Id. at 1127-28. Third, in Rohauer the film's copyright was still valid. In
Russell, the film's copyright had expired, resulting in the film falling into the public domain.
Thus, the court was not forced to consider the mutually exclusive overlapping rights problem
presented in Rohauer. Id. at 1128. See infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text for a
comparison of this case to the issue presented in Abend and Rohauer.
130. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
131. Id. at 19.
132. Id. at 20.
133. Id.
134. Id. At first glance, this seems in conflict with the Second Circuit's holding in Rohauer,
that a derivative work is protected in toto as a new creation unto itself according to section
7 of the 1909 Act. However, this is not the case. Rohauer and Gilliam are consistent: both
holdings are premised on the degree of consent given to the licensees to use the derivative
work. In Gilliam, consent to edit was not given, whereas in Rohauer, consent was given to
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One final case that throws light on determining derivative renewal
rights as between assignees and author's legatees is Mills Music, Inc.
v. Snyder. 35 Snyder is the one Supreme Court case which squarely
discusses the assignability of a derivative work's renewal copyright
as opposed to the assignment of an original work's renewal copy-
right. 136 However, the derivative work assignability question decided
by the five to four majority arose under the 1976 Act. 3 7 Thus, it
was not direct authority for the issue in Abend which arose under
the 1909 Act.
use the derivative work during its renewal term. Colby, supra note 3, at 590-91. See infra
notes 167-70 and accompanying text for added discussion. Gilliam reiterates the rule that
infringement may occur when one exceeds the scope of permission to use the derivative work.
Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 20. The court also stated that copyright infringement may also occur
when the licensee compromises the force or validity of material protected by the copyright in
the underlying work. Id. "Since the copyright in the underlying script survives intact despite
the incorporation of that work into a derivative work, one who uses that script, even with the
permission of the proprietor of the derivative work, may infringe the underlying copyright."
Id. at 20. Melville Nimmer suggests that G. Ricordi and Gilliam "repudiated" the new property
theory which Rohauer adopted. I M. NIMaMR, supra note 42, § 3.07[A] at 3-25.
This "new property right" theory was in effect repudiated in G. Ricordi & Co. v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc .... This case is clearly contrary to the "new property
right" theory since Ricordi was held to have lost the right to exploit the underlying
material as contained in the derivative work notwithstanding the fact that the
derivative work was created during a time when Ricordi had a valid license from
the owner of the underlying work .... It was repudiated once again in Gilliam v.
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc ....
Id.
135. 469 U.S. 153 (1985).
136. Id. at 160. The facts of the case are as follows: The issue in Snyder was "whether
an author's termination of a publisher's interest in a copyright [pursuant to the termination
provision under the 1976 Copyright Act] also terminates the publisher's contractual right to
share in the royalties on such derivative works." Id. at 156. The derivative works in question
were sound recordings of the song "Who's Sorry Now." While Snyder owned only a one-
third interest in the song, the parties agreed that the Court should consider Snyder to be the
sole owner. Id. at 157. In exchange for an advance lump sum royalty and a promise to pay
other royalties accruing from time to time, Snyder assigned all his renewal rights to Mills,
who in turn issued 400 licenses to other companies to create different musical arrangements
of the song, creating many derivative works. Id. at 157-58. Following Snyder's death, his
widow and child became successors-in-interest to the Mills agreement. Id. at 158-59. They
chose to exercise their right of termination under the 1976 Act. Id.
137. Id. at 155. The original song's copyright and renewal copyright were registered under
the 1909 Act. Id. at 157-58. Nevertheless, the 1976 Act governs because the 1976 Act "gave
Snyder's heirs a statutory right to reacquire the copyright that Snyder previously granted to
Mills." Id. at 155 (citing The 1976 Act, supra note 5, § 304(c)(2)). The 1976 Act also provides
an exemption for derivative works prepared under grant of authority. See The 1976 Act, supra
note 5, § 304(c)(6). When the Supreme Court decided Snyder, the derivative exception had not
yet been altered by the 1985 amendment. Snyder, 469 U.S. at 156 n.5. Whether Sheldon
Abend was also granted this statutory right after 1978 was a subissue which determined the
outcome of the case before the Supreme Court in Stewart. Abend bought the rights from
Woolrich's statutory successor, Chase Manhattan Bank, which assigned the renewal rights to
Abend after making a timely renewal of the copyright in 1969. The validity of the assignment
was not contested. Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750, 1758 (1990). At least one commentator
believes that Abend's claim falls under the 1976 Act. See Colby, supra note 3, at 595.
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The Court noted in Snyder that, while the primary purpose of the
1976 revision of the copyright law was to provide increased benefits
to authors, 13 8 the purpose of the Derivative Works Exception 139 was
to exclude a specified type of grant from being susceptible to the
termination provision, even if that exclusion worked an injustice to
authors.' 40 The Court determined that "the consequences of a ter-
mination that section 304 [of the 1976 Act] authorizes simply do not
apply to derivative works that are protected by the Exception defined
in section 304(c)(6)(A). 1 41 The Court prophetically noted that with-
out the Derivative Exception, the 1976 Act would give an author the
right to enjoin continued utilization of motion picture films or to
condition continued use on the payment of a fee which the film's
producers were unwilling to pay. 42
Justice White, writing for the dissent 43 in Snyder, agreed that the
legislative history of the 1976 Act evinced a purpose to shield owners
of derivative works from the injustice of renegotiating rights in
underlying works. 44 Justice White objected to the scope of the
majority's pronouncement, 145 preferring instead to grant termination
rights to the author where the grantee was reaping royalties which
normally would have gone to the author.' 46 Justice White further
observed that the purpose of the renewal copyright term created by
the 1909 Act had been "substantially thwarted" by the Court in
Fisher;47 the termination provision put into place by the 1976 Act
138. Snyder, 469 U.S. at 172. The benefits to authors occurred in the form of extensions
to existing copyrights, a longer term for new copyrights and the termination provision. Id.
The Court also recognized that the termination right "was expressly intended to relieve authors
of the consequences of ill-advised and unremunerative grants that had been made before the
author had a fair opportunity to appreciate the true value of his work." Id. at 172-73.
139. The Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 5, § 304(c)(6)(A). See Derivative Works
Exception, supra note 55.
140. Snyder, 469 U.S. at 173. The Court lists three ways in which the 1976 Act impacts
copyrights. First, automatic extension for copyrights created under the 1909 Act endure until
seventy-five years from the date the copyright was originally procured. Id. at 161 (citing The
1976 Act, supra note 5, § 304(b)). Second, section 304(c) grants heirs a right to terminate
renewal copyrights "any time during the five year period after January 1, 1978 ...." Snyder,
469 U.S. at 162 (citing The 1976 Act, supra note 5, § 304(c)). Third, the 1976 Act operated
to return all rights "covered by the terminated grant" to the widow and child of Snyder. Id.
(quoting The 1976 Act, supra note 5, § 304(c)(6)). This third provision is limited, however, by
operation of the Derivative Works Exception. Id. at 161 (citing The 1976 Act, supra note 5,
§ 304(c)(6)(A)). See supra note 55 for the language of the Derivative Works Exception.
141. Snyder, 469 U.S. at 164.
142. Id. at 177.
143. Justices Marshall, Brennen and Blackmun joined in the dissent.
144. Snyder, 469 U.S. at 183 (White, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 178 (White, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 179 (vhite, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 185 (White, J., dissenting).
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was tailored to guarantee an author or his heirs the right to end a
grant and any rights flowing out of it.141 Interestingly, both the
majority and the dissent in Snyder held that a motion picture
producer, under the Derivative Works Exception of the 1976 Act,
should be allowed to continue to utilize the derivative work created
under previous grant of the author.149
III. DERIVATIVE WORKS AS "NEw PROPERTY":
CONFLICT IN TBE CIRCUITS
A. Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc.
1. Facts
Maude Hull wrote the novel "The Sons of the Sheik," which was
copyrighted in 1925.150 For a lump sum, Hull assigned worldwide
motion picture rights to the story and the right to renew such
copyrights to Killiam Shows' predecessors in interest.' In 1926,
pursuant to Mrs. Hull's grant, the film "Son of Sheik" starring
Rudolph Valentino, was produced and released. 52 Mrs. Hull died in
1943 without renewing the copyright in the underlying story.'53 The
film's copyright was renewed in 1954 and eventually sold to Killiam
Shows in 1968.1-4
After Hull's death, her daughter renewed the copyright in the story
in 1965. l-s The daughter assigned all interest in "Sons of the Sheik,"
including motion picture and television rights, to Rohauer15 6 When
Killiam Shows had a videotape made from the original print without
first obtaining a license for such reproduction, Rohauer brought suit,
alleging that the copying and subsequent television airing of the film
148. Id. at 186 (white, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 177 (majority opinion), id. at 183 (white, J., dissenting).
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constituted copyright infringement under the 1909 Act. 57 Rohauer
claimed that his succession to the story's renewal term terminated all
Killiam Shows' rights to exhibit the motion picture. 58 The Second
Circuit held against Rohauer, finding no copyright infringement. 5 9
The court emphasized that Hull's expressed prior written consent to
assign the renewal term in the derivative product was pivotal in its
decision in favor of Killiam Shows. 160
2. The Second Circuit's Perspective of a Derivative Work as a
"New Property-"
The Second Circuit did not view any of the Supreme Court's
decisions as dispositive of the issue presented in Rohauer.'6' No prior
decisions reconciled the conflict between the grant of derivative
copyright in section 7 of the 1909 Act with the grant of renewal
copyright for underlying works in section 24 of the Act. 62 Instead,
the Second Circuit embraced the "new property right" theory en-
gendered by its decision in Edmond, 63 which held that a the simple
transfer of a copyright in the underlying work does not have an
effect on the copyright of a derivative work.' 64 That finding had
precluded any necessity for the Edmond court to consider whether
the plaintiff consented to the defendant's distribution of copies of
the song. 6 The Second Circuit distinguished Fitch and G. Ricordi
by pointing out that the derivative works were produced under
157. Id. at 486-87.
158. Id. at 487.
159. Id. at 494.
160. Id. at 492.
[W]e do not believe . . that the vesting of renewed copyright in the underlying
work in a statutory successor deprives the proprietor of the derivative copyright of
a right ... to use so much of the underlying copyrighted material as already has
been embodied in the copyrighted derivative work . . . . That view is only a slight
extension of this court's decision in Edmonds v. Stern.
Id. at 492 (citation omitted).
161. Id. at 490.
162. Id.
163. See Edmond v. Stem, 248 F.2d 897, 898 (2d Cir. 1918).
The two things were legally separate, and independent of each other; it makes no
difference that such separate and independent existence might to a certain extent
have grown out of a plaintiff's consent to the incorporation of his melody in the
orchestration. When the consent was given, a right of property sprang into existence,
not at all affected by the conveyance of any other right.
Id.
164. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 492.
165. See Edmond, 248 F.2d at 898.
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licenses limited to the first term of copyright because no consent was
given with regard to any of the renewal rights.166
Melville Nimmer, a preeminent commentator in the field of cop-
yright, noted that the "new property right" theory relied on in
Rohauer has been repudiated by Gilliam v. American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc.167 Six months prior to the Rohauer decision, the
Second Circuit in Gilliam determined that the author's grant restricted
unauthorized editing of a program. 68 In Gilliam, the author of the
underlying script had not granted editing rights which would consti-
tute consent. In Rohauer, however, the original grant expressly
included the copyright renewal term in the conveyance. 69 When
comparing Rohauer to Fitch, Marks Music, Ricordi, or Gilliam, each
may be distinguished on the basis of the author's consent to the
right in question. 70 None of these cases adequately addressed the
issue presented to the Second Circuit in Rohauer.
The Second Circuit deemed its decision in Rohauer as one of first
impression. 7' Finding no prior case which addressed the issue before
it,172 the court relied on legislative history to "ascertain what would
have been the thought of the 1909 Congress on an issue about which
it almost certainly never thought at all.' ' 73 The court read section 7
166. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 490-91.
167. 1 M. NBMMR, supra note 42, § 3.07[A] at 3-24 (1989). See Gilliam v. American
Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
168. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 19.
169. Colby, supra note 3, at 591.
170. Id.
171. Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 486 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 949 (1977). The Second Circuit stated the issue of copyright law as follows:
When the author of a copyrighted story has assigned the motion picture rights and
consented to the assignee's securing a copyright on a motion picture version, with
the terms of the assignment demonstrating an intention that the rights of the
purchaser shall extend through a renewal of the copyright on the story, does a
purchaser who has made a film and obtained a derivative copyright and renewal
thereon infringe upon the copyright on the story if it authorizes the performance of
the copyrighted film after the author has died and the copyright on the story has
been renewed by a statutory successor under 17 U.S.C. § 24 [under the 1909 Act],
who has made a new assignment of the motion picture and television rights?
Id. at 485-86. The court answered that question in the negative. Id. at 486.
172. Id. at 491.
[T]he short of the matter is that we have been cited to no case holding that the
inability of an author to carry out his promise to effect a renewal of a copyright
because of his death prior to the date for obtaining renewal terminates as a matter
of copyright law the right of a holder of a derivative copyright to continue to
publish a derivative work copyrighted before the author's death on which the
copyright was thereafter renewed.
Id.
173. Id. at 486.
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of the 1909 Act to conclude that "Congress provided that derivative
works 'shall be regarded as new works subject to copyright under
the provisions' of the 1909 Act.
1 74
Addressing the second half of section 7, the court in Rohauer
rejected arguments that the "force" of copyright in the underlying
work was affected by the defendant's copying of the derivative film.1
71
The court concluded that the "force and validity" clause of section
7 had no bearing on the case.176 The Second Circuit then looked to
the 1976 Act for additional guidance on Congress' intent with respect
to derivative works. The court held that the Derivative Works Ex-
ception in the 1976 Act evinced Congress' belief that special protec-
tion should be extended to derivative works.
177
In considering the equities of Rohauer, the Second Circuit noted
that where a proprietor has caused a motion picture to be produced
as a derivative product of a novel, the proprietor "will often have
made contributions literary, musical and economic, as great or greater
than the original author.' 1 78 Furthermore, the court acknowledged
that a proprietor has no way to protect himself from the possibility
of the author's death prior to the beginning of the renewal term,
since the proprietor has no method of ascertaining who the heirs,
executor or next of kin will be in such an event, and thus cannot
contract with each of them for the renewal rights.
7 9
B. Abend v. MCA, Inc.
1. Facts
In 1942, Cornell Woolrich granted Popular Publications, Inc. the
right to publish his short story "It Had to Be Murder" in Dime
174. Id. at 488-89 (quoting the 1909 Act, supra note 3, § 7).
175. Id. at 488.
176. Id. (citing LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE 1909 CoP'iuGHT ACT (E. Brylawski & A.
Goldman, eds. 1976)).
177. Id. at 494.
178. Id. at 493.
179. Id. Bricker, supra note 31, at 33 (purchaser of derivative rights has no way to
adequately insure against the author's death prior to the beginning of the renewal period, and
cannot ascertain who the surviving heirs will be due to the possibility of subsequent marriages,
births, kin, or executors).
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Detective Magazine.180 Woolrich retained all other rights in his work.
Via publication in Dime Detective Magazine, Woolrich's short story
was covered by that issue's blanket copyright.
In 1945, Woolrich sold the right to make film versions of several
of his stories, including "It Had to Be Murder," to B.G. De Sylva.' 81
In that literary sales contract, Woolrich agreed to renew the under-
lying copyright in the stories and assign the renewed motion picture
rights to De Sylva Productions for the duration of the second twenty-
eight year copyright term. 8 2 In 1953, Patron, Inc., a production
company formed by actor Jimmy Stewart and director Alfred Hitch-
cock, purchased the motion picture rights to "It Had to Be Murder,"
and, in concert with Paramount Pictures, produced and distributed
the film Rear Window, directed by Hitchcock, starring Stewart and
Grace Kelly. The film was based on Woolrich's short story and made
pursuant to the motion picture rights acquired by Patron, Inc.
Woolrich died in 1968, just prior to the beginning of the copyright
renewal period for the short story, leaving no heirs.13 In 1969, as
executor of his estate, Chase Manhattan Bank renewed the copyright
in "It Had to Be Murder." Chase Manhattan then assigned the short
story's renewal rights in exchange for $650 plus ten percent of all
proceeds from exploitation of the story to a literary agent, Sheldon
Abend. 1'
In 1971, Petitioners Hitchcock, Stewart and MCA Inc. broadcast
Rear Window on television, at which time Abend gave notice that
he owned the renewal rights in the copyright and that the ABC
broadcast of the movie infringed his copyright. Petitioners neverthe-
less renewed their licensing with ABC in 1974, and Abend brought
suit for copyright infringement. The case was settled for $25,000.185
Petitioners rereleased the film in the form of new prints, video
cassettes, and video discs. Subsequent theatrical engagements, tele-
vision airings, and video sales created revenue in the amount of
twelve million dollars. 86
Abend again brought suit against MCA, Stewart and the trustees
of Hitchcock's estate, alleging copyright infringement. Abend claimed
180. Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1467 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd, Stewart v. Abend,






186. Id. at 1468.
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that the rerelease of the film in a variety of media had infringed on
his underlying copyright in the short story. 187 Abend reasoned that
because Woolrich died without fulfilling his contractual promise to
assign renewed motion picture copyrights to petitioners, the 1909 Act
freed the story's renewed copyright from any such contractual con-
straints. 88 Thus, as owner of the story's renewed copyright, Abend
argued that the derivative work's renewed copyright did not apply
to the underlying Woolrich story.
189
2. Ninth Circuit's perspective of a Derivative Work as a "New
Property "
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with Abend and declined to
follow the Second Circuit's holding in Rohauer.'90 The Ninth Circuit
distinguished the facts of Abend from those of Rohauer by noting
that the infringement in Rohauer cofsisted of generating one video-
tape copy of a print of a film to air the film on television while the
infringement in Abend involved authorization by MCA of a nation-
wide re-release of the Rear Window and the marketing of videocas-
settes.191 However, this distinction is irrelevant to the question of
copyright infringement. If the renewal term has been conveyed by
the author's grant as construed by contract, then it should not matter
what medium the purchaser employs to generate a return on this
investment.
The Ninth Circuit determined that the Supreme Court's decision
in Miller Music exclusively controlled the copyright issue in Abend.1 92
Following Miller Music's holding that an assignment of renewal rights
prior to the beginning of the renewal period is no more than a
contingency, 93 the Ninth Circuit held that the author's contractual
assignment of the film's renewal rights was "ineffective and irrele-
vant" because he had died before renewing these rights in his
187. Id. Abend also alleged that petitioners' rerelease of the film inhibited his ability to
use the story, namely, by interfering with his attempts to produce a stage play and a television
version of the short story for Home Box Office; by attempting to sell the right to make a
television sequel; and by interfering with his ability to produce other derivative works based
on the story. Id.
188. Id. at 1472.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1473.
191. Id. at 1477.
192. Id. at 1475.
193. See Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 377 (1960).
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underlying story and thus could not have assigned a right that did
not exist. 194 This point avoids an illogical result that would allow one
to assign rights which do not yet exist under section 24 of the 1909
Act. However, rights do nevertheless exist under section 7 of the
1909 Act, which creates an exclusive and separate property interest
in derivative works created under consent by the author. 19
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the distinctions made by the Second
Circuit with respect to Fitch and G. Ricordi as "meaningless."' 196
The Ninth Circuit believed that the author's contractual assignment
was "plainly unenforceable against his statutory successors" by op-
eration of the 1909 Act, as interpreted by Miller Music.197 The court
concluded that in Fitch and G. Ricordi there had merely been a
dispute whether, from the outset, the respective renewal terms were
ever part of the author's assignment. 198
In Abend, the Ninth Circuit focused primarily on the congressional
intent of section 24 of the 1909 Act, concluding that the purpose of
the section, giving authors a "second chance" for remuneration for
their creative works, was more compelling in Abend than in Ro-
hauer.199 This conclusion was due to the increased marketability of
the film as a result of technological developments that could not
have been foreseen at the time the author signed the literary sales
agreement. 200 Additionally, section 24 was intended to protect the
family of the author in the event the author died during the initial
copyright period. 20 1
The Ninth Circuit recognized that interpretation of sections 7 and
24 of the 1909 Act was necessary to resolve the issue before it.202
The Abend court disposed of this conflict between sections 7 and 24
by subordinating section 7, invoking the traditional rule that "a
derivative copyright protects only the new material contained in the
derivative work, not the matter derived from the underlying work.1"203
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the Second Circuit's reliance on the 1976
194. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1475.
195. Id. at 1476.
196. Id. at 1475.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1477.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1478.
203. Id. at 1473. See Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 1979), cerl. denied
446 U.S. 952 (1980).
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Act to establish congressional intent and determined that the Deriv-
ative Works Exception in the 1976 Act did not apply to the initial
twenty-eight year renewal term of the 1909 Act, but only to the 1976
Act's extension of the renewal term.204
In examining the equities, the Ninth Circuit took notice of the
Second Circuit's observation that, in creating a derivative work,
people other than the author may have made contributions as great
or greater than the author;2 5 however, the court pointed out that
"other derivative works protected by the Rohauer rule might involve
only minimal contributions to the underlying work. Consequently,
this rationale alone cannot justify Rohauer's holding. ' ' 206 The Ninth
Circuit recognized concerns regarding the parties' respective contri-
butions of capital investment, creative effort and talent in the pro-
duction of the film, but chose to weigh these elements only when
determining a remedy. 207
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Thompson asserted that the copyrights
in both the underlying story as well as the film Rear Window could
be renewed under section 24 of the 1909 Act. 20 8 Judge Thompson
argued that section 24 entitled the film to receive the full spectrum
of copyright protection given to any other work copyrighted under
the 1909 Act, even Woolrich's underlying story.2°9 Judge Thompson
distinguished Russell from the facts of Abend because the former
204. Id. at 1473 (quoting Russell, 612 F.2d at 1128).
205. Id. at 1479. But see Colby, supra note 3, at 77-78:
[I]t may be said that Rohauer ... is the rule for years 29-56 of the copyright
renewal of the underlying work, and that section 304(c)(6)(A) of the 1976 Act is the
rule for years 57-75, after which the underlying work passes into the public domain
... [Iff Rohauer is not followed in the Ninth Circuit ... there might be the
following anomalous result: the motion picture could not be distributed during years
29-56, but could be rereleased during years 57-75, notwithstanding termination under
section 304(c)(6)(A). If the author had not died during the years 1-28, the motion
picture could be distributed throughout the years 1-75 .... If, however, the author
dies during years 29-56, and if the motion picture is produced during years 29-56
[after the author has granted renewal rights in the derivative work] ... the motion
picture may be lawfully distributed during years 29-56, the copyright renewal term
of the underlying work, and during years 57-75, notwithstanding termination under
section 304(c)(6)(A).
Id.
206. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1477.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1483-87 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 1484 (Thompson, J., dissenting). Judge Thompson noted that "[n]othing in the
1909 Act limits the use a copyright holder can make of his properly created derivative work."
Id. If the derivative work is created pursuant to a license from the author, section 7 provides
that the creation "shall be regarded as [a] new work subject to copyright under provisions of
this title." Id. at 1484; The 1909 Act, supra note 3, § 7.
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concerned only one copyrighted work. The film's copyright in Russell
had expired. 210 Although the film had fallen into the public domain,
this fact did not give defendants the right to exhibit the film because
it contained underlying material which was still protected by copy-
right. 21'
Judge Thompson concluded that when Woolrich died, the only
right that MCA had lost was the right to create new movies based
on the story, not the right to continue exhibiting a product of its
own creation.2 2 Judge Thompson noted that, unlike Miller Music,
Russell, or any other case concerning only one copyrighted work,
the Ninth Circuit was "faced with two works of equal dignity in the
eyes of copyright law. ' 213 Each work has its own spectrum of rights,
separate from the other. Thus, Rohauer did not interfere with the
right of an author's successor to license new derivative works or
exploit any other rights in the story so long as the use did not
infringe on the new material MCA incorporated into the film Rear
Window.214
IV. TiE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN FAVOR OF SHELDON
ABEND: WooLRicH's ASSIGNMENT OF THE Rear Window Renewal
Copyright Was Invalid.
With its holding in Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc. ,215 the Second
Circuit ran into direct conflict with the 1960 United States Supreme
Court decision in Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc.
216
This conflict peaked when the district court in the Abend case granted
210. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1485 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
211. Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 446 U.S. 952
(1980).
212. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1487 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 1485 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
214. Id. (Thompson, J., dissenting).
215. 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977).
216. 362 U.S. 373 (1960). The issue concerns the rights of the owner of a derivative work's
copyright in utilizing the work for commercial gain during the copyright renewal period of
the underlying pre-existing work from which the derivative work (in this case a motion picture)
was created. The conflict between the two cases focuses on whether the statutory successors
to the rights of the pre-existing work can defeat the derivative work's owners of their right to
use "so much of the underlying copyrighted work as has already been embodied in the
copyrighted derivative work" (the motion picture). Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750, 1757
(quoting Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977) cert. denied 421 U.S.
949). Rohauer stands for the propositibn that the successors cannot. Id. at 1756, 1760-61.
Miller says they can, if the author of the pre-existing work makes no timely renewal and dies
before the time for renewal accrues. Id. at 1757.
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summary judgment to Stewart based on Rohauer, and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed based primarily on Miller. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the dispute between
Rohauer and the Miller-based Abend.217
Reaffirming its position stated in Miller, the Supreme Court held
in Stewart that, where the author of a pre-existing work assigned his
rights in the renewal term to the derivative work's owner, but died
before personally making a timely renewal, use of the derivative
work for commercial gain infringes on the pre-existing work's cop-
yright.2 18 However, no infringement occurs if the owners of the
derivative work obtain all rights to a valid renewal from the author's
successors. 219 Furthermore, although a separate copyright for the
derivative work can be secured, 220 the Court stated that copyright
applies only to the new matter added by the derivative proprietor,
and "the element drawn from the pre-existing work remains on grant
from the owner of the pre-existing work. ' 22' Therefore, regardless
of how intertwined a work and its inspiration are, they nevertheless
exist separately under copyright law.'
Finally, the Stewart Court held that pre-existing work owners who
sell their creations to derivative work proprietors can exercise inal-
ienable termination rights, but are limited in one respect. 223 With the
termination provision enacted in the 1976 Copyright Act,24 Congress
granted to the author of pre-existing works a third opportunity to
benefit from his creations, the first two being the original copyright
term of twenty-eight years and the second twenty-eight year renewal
term. The third is a nineteen year extension taking effect at the end
of the renewal term which applies to works that were in their original
or renewal terms as of January 1, 1978. Section 304 of the 1976
Copyright Act, however, limits the author's termination right with
respect to derivative works for which the derivative owner has held
valid original and renewal rights in the pre-existing work. 5 Thus, at
the end of the first renewal term, the author cannot terminate the
217. Stewart, at 1758.
218. Id. at 1763.
219. Id. at 1760.
220. Id. at 1765 (citing 17 U.S.C § 7 (1976)).
221. Id. at 1761.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1762.
224. See General Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, codified
at 17 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. (1976).
225. Id. § 304(c)(6)(A).
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use of the derivative work if the owners of the derivative work held
valid original and renewal rights throughout both copyright terms.
226
The author is limited to terminating only the right to create new
derivative works from the underlying pre-existing work. 27 This,
"compromise," the Stewart court held, intended to reconcile the
competing interests of the derivative proprietor and the original
author.2s
Stewart effectively overruled Rohauer2 9 by conclusively construing
the meaning and intent of section 7 of the 1909 Copyright Act and
that section's relation to the renewal provision in section 24, as
recodified in the revised Act of 1976.230 Section 7, with its substitution
of the word "publication" for "copyright," confers copyright upon
a derivative work, but limits the copyright to the original material
created in the derivative work. 23' The term "publication" in place of
"copyright" was intended to preserve the "force and validity" of
the pre-existing work's copyright and prevent that work, by virtue
of publication, from being swept into the public domain by the
derivative work's publication. 232
According to the Stewart majority, the derivative copyright does
not grant new copyright status to the Woolrich story and confer that
status to the derivative owners .233 Since the majority determined that
section 7, although granting an independent copyright to the deriv-
ative work, does not thereby extinguish all copyrights in the under-
lying work and confer them to the derivative owners,234 the renewal
provision of section 24 continues to apply to the underlying work.
Since Woolrich could not fulfill his promise to personally renew
the copyright in "It Had to Be Murder," a precondition under Miller
to obtaining valid rights, the property interest in his story vested in
226. Id.
227. Stewart, 110 S. Ct. at 1762. To illustrate, if Stewart owned a valid copyright in
Woolrich's story throughout the entire original and renewal terms of the 1976 Copyright Act,
he could still distribute and exploit Rear Window after the expiration of the first renewal term
even if Abend terminated his grant of rights. But Stewart could not, however, produce a new
version of the story. Id.
228. Id. at 1760-62.
229. Though the Court held Rohauer inapplicable in this case, "it might make some sense"
in other contexts. Id. at 1763.
230. 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1976).
231. Stewart, 110 S. Ct. at 1766-67.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1765-66.
234. Id. at 1767. The majority held that reading section 7 together with section 3 "under-
mines" rather than supports the dissent's interpretation of the statute that derivative work
copyrights wrest control from the underlying author. Id. at 1766-67.
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his executors, who timely renewed the copyright and sold it to Abend.
According to the majority's reasoning, Abend's title to the copyright
in Woolrich's story is valid against the world. Therefore, since the
defendants could not secure a transfer of renewal rights, the Stewart
court held that the defendants were precluded from further distrib-
uting the motion picture Rear Window. 23"
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS IN STEWART: THE SUPpEME
COURT LOOKS THROUGH THE WINDow.
A. The Majority
Citing Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc. 36 and Fred
Fisher Co. v. Witmark & Sons2 7 as controlling authorities, the
Supreme Court explained that, where the author of the pre-existing
work dies before assigning the renewal rights to the holder of the
derivative copyright, infringement may occur not because the author's
contractual promise to assign was invalid, but rather because the
holder of the derivative copyright has only an expectancy that the
author will indeed fulfill his promise to assign. 2 8 The Court espoused
the view that any renewal interest in the derivative rights does not
vest until the author of the underlying work has applied for the
renewal and has assigned those rights. 239 Thus, in announcing this
interpretation of the 1909 Act, the Supreme Court overruled Rohauer
v. Killiam Shows, Inc.,24° which had chosen to balance the equities
in a factual setting similar to that of Stewart v. Abend.241 Although
noting that the Rohauer rule may work well in some situations, the
Court determined that general application of Rohauer would "make
235. Id. at 1768.
236. 362 U.S. 373 (1960). See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text for a detailed
discussion of this case.
237. 318 U.S. 643 (1943). See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text for a further
discussion of this case.
238. Stewart, 110 S. Ct. at 1759.
239. Id. at 1759 (quoting 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, part K at
77 (E. Brylawski & A. Goldman eds. 1976) (statement of Mr. Hale)).
240. 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977). See supra notes 150-79 and accompanying text for further
discussion of this case.
241. Stewart, 110 S. Ct. at 1760-61.
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little sense when ... applied across the derivative works spectrum.' '242
Additionally, the Supreme Court dismissed the argument that the
1976 Act implicitly supported the existence of a separate right to
exploit a derivative work. Explaining the impact of the 1976 Act,
the Court stated:
[The plain language of section 7 [of the 1909 Act] supports the
view that the full force of the copyright in the pre-existing work is
preserved despite incorporation into the derivative work. This well
settled rule also was made explicit in the 1976 Act .... In effect,
the 1976 Act provides a third opportunity for the author to benefit
from his work in its original or renewal term .... Congress ...
created one exception [which provides that] the author may not, at
the end of the renewal term, terminate the right to use a derivative
work for which the owner of the derivative work has held valid
rights in the original and renewal term. . . . In other words [peti-
tioners argue] because Congress decided not to permit authors to
exercise a third opportunity to benefit from a work incorporated
into a derivative work, the [1976] Act expresses a general policy of
undermining the author's second opportunity. We disagree. 243
Instead, the Court reasoned that section 304(c)(6)(A) of the 1976 Act
was merely a compromise between many special interest groups, and
could not adequately support a sweeping change in congressional
policy with regard to copyrights. 2" The Court decided that the plain
language of section 304(c)(6)(A) assumed that the author of the
underlying work retained the right to sue for any infringement despite
incorporation of that pre-existing work into a derivative product. As
evidence of this assumption, the Court pointed to Congress' explicit
withdrawal of the right to terminate use rights in certain limited
circumstances. 245 The plain language of the 1909 Act "requires that
the underlying work's copyright term exists independently of the
242. Id. at 1763. The Court explained:
In the case of a condensed book ... the contribution by the derivative author may
be little, while the contribution by the original author is great. Yet, under the
Rohauer 'rule,' publication of the condensed book would not infringe the pre-existing
work even though the derivative author has no license or valid grant of rights in
the pre-existing work.
Id.
243. Id. at 1761-62 (citations omitted).
244. Stewart, 110 S. Ct. at 1762.
245. Id. at 1763.
Absent an explicit statement of congressional intent that the rights in the renewal
term of an owner of a pre-existing work are extinguished upon incorporation of his
work into another work, it is not our role to alter the delicate balance Congress has
labored to achieve.
Id. at 1765.
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derivative work's term, even when incorporated and even though the
derivative work holder owns copyright in the whole 'work.' "246
B. The Dissent
Written by Justice Stevens and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia, the dissent argued that the majority opinion
subverted the policy and purpose of the constitutional grant of power
to create copyrights.2 47 Exploring the statutory language of section
7, the historical background of the 1909 Act, and the draft of the
Act itself, the dissent concluded that:
[n]either section 24 [of the 1909 Act] nor any other provision ...
expressly or by implication, prevents the author [of a pre-existing
work] from exercising any of his other statutory rights during the
original term of the copyright. [He] may contract to sell his work
at a bargain price during the original term ... even if performance
of the contract diminished the value of the copyright to the owner
of the renewal interest .... Similarly, . . . the right of an assignee
should not be limited by the interests of the owners of the renewal
copyright in the underlying work ... the result should be no
different when the author exercises his right to consent to creation
of a derivative work by another .... The continued publication
of the derivative work, after expiration of the original term of the
prior work, does not infringe any of the statutory successor's rights
in the renewal copyright of the original work.248
Thus, the dissent took issue at the majority's notion that Woolrich
had assigned a right to use this short story as a basis for the film
Rear Window. The dissent viewed the contract as a sale of motion
picture rights, resulting in the creation of a new and separate work
possessed of independent copyrights .249
246. Id. at 1767-68.
247. Id. at 1769 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The Constitution authorizes the Congress: "To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . ." [] Section 7 of the Copyright
Act of 1909 U furthers that purpose; [section] 24 of that Act, as construed by the
Court in this case, does not.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
248. Id. at 1776 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 1777-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Woolrich did not just assign the publisher rights to copy and vend his work. Rather,
he expressed his consent to production of a derivative work under section 7 [of the
1909 Act]. The possession of a copyright on a properly created derivative work gives
the proprietor rights superior to those of a mere licensee.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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VI. WHAT'S LEFT AFTER STEWART V. ABEND?
The problem presented in Abend and Rohauer arose because of
the ambiguous grant of rights under the 1909 Act. The literary works'
(hereinafter "works") renewal copyrights were authorized by section
24.250 The motion pictures' derivative copyrights were authorized by
section 7. 251 Thus, sections 24 and 7 seem to grant the proprietors
"overlapping 'exclusive' rights' 1212 to utilize material from the works
which had been incorporated into the films. 253
In Abend, the issue was not whether the author may assign his
renewal rights in a copyright, but whether an author's successor in
interest may lay claim to the renewal rights in a derivative work
which has already been promised to a third party prior to the author's
death.2 4 The 1985 amendments to the 1976 Act speak to this issue,
but the 1909 Copyright Act does not directly address the issue. 255
It is interesting to note that this derivative copyright issue is not
likely to arise under the 1976 Act. Since 1978, copyrights consist of
a single term lasting for the life of the author plus fifty years. 256
Because there is no automatic reversion of copyrights under the 1976
Act, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Abend with the knowl-
edge that the decision will affect a finite number of copyrights
established under the two-tier renewal system of the 1909 Act. 257
These include copyrights in songs, paintings and clips of films in-
corporated into another motion picture. However, the impact of the
Court's decision will be profound in both financial and artistic terms
because, although finite, the number of potential cases is not yet
known and not readily ascertainable. 2 8
250. Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1484 (9th Cir. 1988) (Thompson, J., dissenting).
251. Comment, Derivative Copyright, supra note 45, at 912.
252. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1485 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (citing Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d
1123 (9th Cir. 1979)); The 1909 Act, supra note 3, § 24.
253. Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750, 1758 (1990).
254. Id. at 1757.
255. Stewart, 110 S. Ct. at 1759; The 1909 Act, supra note 3, § 7.
256. Bricker, supra note 31, at 31. "Certainly there is nothing in the [1909] Act which
restricts the transfer of the renewal expectancy, and there would seem to be no reason to place
any restraint on alienation in the absence of a clear showing of legislative intent." Id.
257. Since January 1, 1978, copyrights no longer consist of an initial and a renewal term,
but rather are composed of a single term enduring for the life of the author plus fifty years.
The 1976 Act, supra note 5, § 302(a).
258. Los Angeles Times, Oct. 3, 1989 § VI (Calendar), at 1, cols. 2-3 [hereinafter, Los
Angeles Times]. "Unless this ruling is reversed . . . 'hundreds, if not thousands' of movies
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The equities in Abend did not clearly fall on one side or the other
of the dispute. An attempt to draw a line for the convenience of
courts and future contracting parties would likely impinge on some
of the expectations of one of the contracting parties.
The Supreme Court's decision directly affects the rights of authors'
statutory successors under the 1909 Act. Chase Manhattan validly
succeeded in interest to the author's underlying work and executed
a valid transfer of those rights to Abend. To hold the executor's
succession invalid is contrary to the language the 1909 Act, as
interpreted by White-Smith.259 To hold the executor's transfer invalid
is contrary to the intent of the statute.
2 6
Had the Court denied an author's successor rights under the
statute, the Court would have frustrated the basic premise of the
monopoly sanctioned by the Constitution itself.261 If the author's
heirs, executors or kin cannot freely dispose of the renewal interest,
no further remunerative benefits will flow from the statutory reser-
vation. 262 To remain consistent with Congress' purpose, statutory
successors should have the right to exercise their judgement in the
resale of the renewal interests. 261 Ironically, this is also the argument
for the opposing view, that authors should have unfettered discretion
to negotiate the initial sale of their works.
264
Secondly, motion picture producers were in a superior position to
realize that when they contracted with Woolrich, they would obtain
only a contingent promise at best. Motion picture producers have
begun to rely on judicial pronouncements to ensure their contingent
renewal rights only since the Rohauer decision. 265 Additionally, ap-
may face copyright infringement suits .... Id. (quoting Stephen Kroft). Kroft noted that
such conflicts may arise out of "old copyrights of stories, songs, paintings or literary characters,
which were incorporated into the films." Id.
259. Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750, 1758 (1990).
260. If the executor is prevented from selling the renewal copyright in an author's work,
the author's estate will not receive the remuneration intended by Congress.
261. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. See also Stewart, 110 S. Ct. at 1769 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
262. See Stewart, 110 S. Ct. at 1758-60, 1764. See also De Sylva v. Ballantine, 351 U.S.
570, 582 (1956); Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 651 (1943) (the
statute operates as a "compulsory bequest").
263. Stewart, 110 S. Ct. at 1759.
264. See Fred Fisher v. M.- Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 656-657 (1943) (Justice
Frankfurter noting that authors are sufficiently capable to negotiate the sale of their works).
265. Note, Inequitable Anomalies, supra note 45, at 652 n.129. Prior to the Second
Circuit's holding in Rohauer, motion picture companies routinely secured consent from all
statutory successors whom they could easily locate. The Second Circuit itself remarked that
such business practices are "obvious[ly] good sense ... so long as the law remains unsettled."
Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 493 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949
(1977).
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plying a theory of tort law, the motion picture producer is in the
best position to spread the cost of remunerating authors whose works
have become and remain popular. Motion picture companies benefit
directly, in the form of added box office and video market sales and
rentals, and indirectly from the advertising which they may attach
to the film in the form of coming attractions both at the theater or
on video. It seems unjust to allow producers to continue to reap
vast profits from a highly successful film which had its genesis in
the mind of another.
However, while the apportionment of profits from a single very
successful movie may seem unfair, it must be remembered that
authors of less successful works have disproportionately benefitted
beyond the popular worth of their contributions. With regard to the
"share the wealth" theory, Judge Thompson, dissenting in the Ninth
Circuit's Abend decision, closed his argument with words that best
summarize the potential for inequity resulting from a decision in
Abend's favor:
I don't see why Abend should be permitted to squeeze the defendants
for money generated by a movie which they created, in which they
risked their capital, and to which they committed their substantial
talents. Granted, the defendants used Woolrich's story. But they
paid him for it, and he agreed to assign his renewal rights in the
story to them. Now, because of the quirk of fate that Woolrich
died before the renewal term of the copyright in the underlying
story, Abend, according to the majority, is entitled to a portion of
Rear Window's profits. It just doesn't make sense.266
Had the Supreme Court followed Judge Thompson's reasoning,
its holding would have preserved the practice currently observed in
the film industry. 267 In reliance on Rohauer, film companies believed
that they enjoyed some sense of security in distributing derivative
films. The Supreme Court has upset this practice, the effect being
that these companies may be liable to pay author's assigns potentially
vast sums for past copyright infringement. 26 A more reasonable
266. Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1487 (9th Cir. 1988) (Thompson, J., dissenting).
267. Id.
268. Id. A precise figure hinges on the language of literary contracts, the survival or demise
of many authors, the timely renewal of underlying story rights by heirs, executors, and
subsequent success of the derivative work to make the cause of action worthwhile. Some
classic films have already fallen within this fact pattern. These include: Gone With the Wind,
A Place in the Sun, George Washington Slept Here, The Man Who Came To Dinner, The
Night Has A Thousand Eyes, Thanks For The Memories, and You Can't Take It With You.
Colby, supra note 3, at 571. Perhaps in anticipation of a favorable result, Sheldon Abend has
already purchased the rights of at least 100 old copyrights. Los Angeles Times, supra note
258, at 7, col. 5.
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pronouncement would limit the effect of such a reversal by requiring
infringement causes of action to be prospective, thereby precluding
claims of past infringement. Nevertheless, the practical effect of even
this pronouncement would be to financially penalize companies who
count on continued distribution in order to recoup their past invest-
ments.
To justify its holding, the Supreme Court in Stewart would have
had to qualify its decision in Fisher, which established the right to
assign inchoate renewal rights at least in the original work. 269 The
Stewart Court could have either upset that holding or qualified it in
some way so as to permit an author to assign the copyright in his
book along with its renewal interest while simultaneously denying
another author the right to sell the renewal rights in a derivative
work whose creation he is permitted to license. If, according to
Fisher, an author can assign the copyright renewal interest in his
original work, an assignment of a renewal interests in a derivative
work should not be treated differently. Unlike the original work, a
derivative work is not the author's own creation, but a product of
the creativity and ideas of many individuals.270 The author's idea
may be merely the jumping-off point for a new concept. Such
measurements are difficult to quantify, especially when two separate
media are involved.
Furthermore, a finding in favor of petitioner James Stewart would
not have stripped Abend of his right to exploit Woolrich's story.
27
'
Abend could have even licensed a sequel to Rear Window, while
Stewart's ability to enjoy the profits of his creative endeavors would
have been preserved. This view would meet all the policy concerns
of copyright law. Z72 The statutory successor to Woolrich would have
been remunerated by licensing new productions. The creativity of the
film producers would also be rewarded financially (and thereby
encouraged) by granting the producers exclusive control over the
film's future revenue. Finally, the public would benefit indirectly by
having access to the film, as well as to any new works which Abend
might license in the future. The Supreme Court should not have
269. See Fred Fisher v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 645 (1943).
270. Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988) (addressing remedies).
271. Note, Inequitable Anomalies, supra note 45, at 652 n.126. See Comment, Derivative
Copyright, supra note 45, at 928 n.125 (quoting Amicus Curiae Brief of United Artists to the
Second Circuit in Rohauer at 26-27)); Abend, 863 F.2d at 1487 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
272. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1487.
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permitted Abend to circumvent the author's intention and collect a
windfall merely by reason of the author's untimely death.273
Additionally, the decision in Abend's favor compounds the burdens
of film producers. Currently, producers spend great sums of money
to produce derivative work films based on literary material. 274 The
motion picture and television industry, like that of the literary
publishing industry, is analogous to gambling,275 in that vast sums
of money will be spent in the hopes of garnishing one or two "hits"
which will remunerate producers for all the other creative ventures
they have played out.2 76 By requiring producers to pay the creativity
"tax' 277 twice to air the product of their own labors, the Court has
only increased the spiraling cost of filmmaking, which will result in
the complete withdrawal of many films from the market. 278
The finding in favor of Abend will act to chill further creativity
by derivative work proprietors. If a proprietor has acquired exclusive
motion picture rights as late as 1975, he may be reluctant to exercise
those rights to create a film (if he has not already done so) or its
sequel for fear that the renewal copyright may not be granted as
promised. Also, such a finding will encourage litigation, and may
encourage third parties to take advantage of ignorant heirs, divesting
them of their rights in order to obtain great leverage against motion
picture producers.
Finally, the Supreme Court does not provide a rule of law easily
followed by lower courts to determine damages. By affirming the
Ninth Circuit's ruling in Abend, the Court leaves open the use of
273. See id. See also Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977). The facts of Abend and Rohauer are remarkably similar, with
one significant exception: Abend was no heir to Woolrich's estate, unlike Maude Hull'sdaughter in Rohauer, who was an heir to Hull's estate. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 486. Indeed,
the inequities between these two cases are somewhat reversed as a result of section 24. InRohauer, the heiress should have benefitted, since, according to the treatment given section24 by Congress, family remuneration is the statute's primary intention. Stewart v. Abend, 110S. Ct. 1750, 1769 (1990). Moreover, Abend should have lost his bid for control of RearWindow, since he held no interest (pursuant to Congressional debates of the 1909 Act) inWoolrich's estate besides a purely economic one manifested in his lawsuits. Therefore, section24's provision for executors should be limited when an author dies without heirs before
renewing the copyright on a work which he has previously assigned.
274. Today's average investment approaches or exceeds $17 million in production costs.Brief Amicus Curiae for Petitioners at 4, Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750 (1990) (No. 88-2102) (quoting Daily Variety, Pic Budgets Reach for the Sky, June 28, 1989).
275. Chaffee, supra note 27, at 509.
276. Id. at 509-10.
277. Id. at 507 (quoting Macaulay, Copyright (1841 speech in House of Commons), in 8
WoRbs 195, 197 (Trevelyan ed. 1879)).
278. Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1487 (9th Cir. 1988) (Thompson, J., dissenting).
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an approach to assign a percentage of "credit" akin to ascertaining
the degree of fault in a personal injury format. 279 The Supreme Court
should have given lower courts some firm guidelines for apportioning
the profits of success. This will be critical since it is likely that those
films which have recouped their initial expenses and are in a profit
position will be the major source of any litigation in the future.
VII. CONCLUSION
Sections 7 and 24 of the Copyright Act of 1909 create an ambiguity
in the law of copyright. Where an author consents to the creation
of a derivative work based on his literary product, that new creation
may be copyrighted as a separate entity according to section 7 of
the 1909 Act. Pursuant to section 24, all original copyrights may be
extended for an additional term of twenty-eight years. If the author
has expressly promised to assign the derivative work's renewal term,
but dies prior to the beginning of that term without first renewing
the copyright, such a promise should preclude the claims of the
author's statutory successors. The Supreme Court should have relied
on the changes made in copyright law by the 1976 Act, specifically
the Derivative Works Exception. These changes are indicative of
Congress' desire to protect the rights of derivative work's proprietors.
Analysis of both Supreme Court and lower court decisions yield
no fact pattern directly on point before Abend, other than that of
Rohauer. While Miller Music states that the renewal interest in the
original copyright returns to an author's heirs if the author dies prior
to the beginning of the renewal term, Miller Music does not state
whether this doctrine should be applied to a separate derivative work
possessing its own copyright under section 7 of the 1909 Act.
Finally, in weighing the policy concerns, the Supreme Court should
have considered the following: 1) The contributions made by the
licensee in such a situation; 2) the inability of the licensee to protect
his interest in any other manner, and; 3) the continued ability of the
author's successors to exploit the underlying work in other ways, to
recoup the remuneration Congress intended to provide. Because the
Court found for Abend, derivative works producers will be deterred
279. See id. at 1479-80 (requesting the district court to use a "reasonable formula" to
permit a "reasonable and just apportionment" of profits based on the fair market value of
the story).
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from further creation and the author's rightful heirs may actually be
shortchanged.
Had the Court ruled in Stewart's favor, the Court could have
fairly extended the benefits of the congressional copyright monopoly
to all parties concerned. Abend could have exploited the rights which
he bought from Woolrich's estate. The film's proprietors would be
rewarded for their creativity, as the copyright monopoly intended,
and the public could continue to enjoy a classic film as well as any
new works licensed by Abend. A finding in favor of Stewart would
have preserved the spirit of copyright law and barred future litigants
from divesting derivative copyright proprietors of their rightful re-
muneration under the 1909 Act.
